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Discussion of The Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing:
Evidence from Private U.S. Firms
1. Introduction
Minnis [2010] explores the hypothesis that audited financial statements are more informative
than unaudited financial statements in private firms. Specifically, he argues that audit verification of
firms’ accounting process and reporting gives financial statements greater credibility, resulting in a
lower cost of debt for audited firms. Using an endogenous switching model to control for the
voluntary choice of using an auditor, he finds audited firms have an interest rate 69 basis points lower
than non-audited firms. Further, he observes audited firms’ cost of debt is more sensitive to variations
in some financial statement variables than non-audited firms.
There is a substantial literature in finance and accounting on cost of debt in private firms, in
part attributable to the large representative samples from the Federal Reserve Board administered
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). Specifically, Minnis [2010] provides further evidence of
the role of auditing on private firms’ cost of debt. Survey and experimental research finds that users,
such as bank loan officers, generally regard audited financial statements to be more credible and
reliable than non-audited financial statements (Reckers and Pany 1979; McKinley, Pany, and Reckers
1985; Pillsbury 1985; Nair and Rittenberg 1987; Strawser 1991). However, these studies also
generally fail to find an association between auditor use or quality and firms’ cost of debt (Houghton
1983; McKinley, Puny, and Reckers 1985; Johnson, Pany, and White 1983; Pany and Smith 1982).
Archival studies on private firms’ cost of debt and auditor engagement have also provided mixed
evidence. Blackwell, Noland, and Winters [1998] find auditor use associated with lower interest rates
in 212 revolving credit agreements from six US banks. Allee and Yohn [2010], using a representative
sample of 1,481 US private firms, finds no association between audit association and cost of debt.
Kim, Simunic, Stein and Yi [2007], using a panel sample of 9,168 privately held Korean firm-years
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find lower interest rate spreads for audited firms and even lower spreads for firms with Big 4
auditors. Further, exploiting the panel nature of their data they find firms that change from being not
audited to audited have significant reductions in their cost of debt. Minnis provides evidence
consistent with auditing reducing firms’ cost of debt after controlling for firms’ endogenous audit
choice.
In more novel evidence, Minnis provides a mechanism for why firms with audited financial
statements have lower cost of debt. He argues that audit verification improves the predictive ability of
reported net income on future cash flows. Regressing one-year ahead cash flows from operations on
contemporaneous net income, he finds net income better predicts future cash flows in audited
financial statements compared to non-audited financial statements. Decomposing net income into its
cash flow and accrual components, he observes that both cash flow and accruals have greater
persistence for audited firms than non-audited firms. These findings are consistent with recent
evidence that suggests auditors do affect financial reporting properties in private firms (CanoRodriguez 2010). Finally, partitioning the sample by firm size, he finds both the interest rate
reduction and the improvement of net income predictive ability from auditing is concentrated in
smaller firms. He argues that auditors have incrementally more expertise to enhance smaller firms’
accrual estimation process as smaller firms have weaker internal accounting capabilities than larger
firms. Overall, Minnis investigates an important and timely topic as accounting regulators are placing
increasing emphasis on accounting methods in privately-held businesses, particularly the costs and
benefits of mandating GAAP and other accounting practices on smaller firms (AICPA/FASB 2006;
IASB 2007).
In section 2, I describe the unique features of the private firm setting and how it affects
research design and inference. First, I discuss the effect of sample selection choices on the study
findings. Second, I detail the alternative information sources available to debt financiers of private
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firms that may be more important than, or diminish the role of, audited financial statements. Third, I
review research in the private firm setting that documents important firm-lender information
asymmetries and the many omitted correlated variables such as the loan characteristics, contractual
terms, and the characteristics of the entrepreneur that affect cost of debt and likely affect Minnis’s
findings. Fourth, I use Minnis’s cost of debt measure as an example to discuss how some
measurement concerns are exacerbated in smaller private firms.
In Section 3, I discuss more specifically the validity of the econometric methods employed
and the specific hypotheses. First, I provide examples where auditing is not voluntary for private
firms. Second, I provide several concerns of conference participants that raise doubts as to the
validity of the instrument used in the paper and I conjecture about what it may be capturing. Third, I
discuss propensity matching and the importance of firm size on the observed findings. In Section 4, I
raise questions about the validity of Minnis’s findings and the arguments underlying his second and
third hypotheses. I also question whether the size-based results are driven by firms’ internal
capabilities or one of the many other size-correlated constructs. Section 5 concludes.
2. Private Firm Setting
The strength of the private firm setting is the exposure to varied environmental, regulatory,
and other forces compared to those that affect public firms, providing an important laboratory to
investigate fundamental accounting issues. Private firms provide a more powerful setting to examine
the use of auditors on cost of debt capital than publicly-listed firms given the greater information
asymmetries and risk of default. There is a strong nexus between financial reporting and cost of debt
as lenders are the primary external users of financial reports from small, privately-held firms (Nair
and Rittenberg, 1983). Further, like other mandated accounting practices for public firms, many
private businesses have no regulatory requirements for being audited. While the economic
magnitudes are not generalizable to public firms, the strength of the hypothesized influence of
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accounting verification, and the empirical variation in the accounting and dependent variables make
private firms an ideal sample to investigate this fundamental accounting issue.
2.1 SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS
The sample used by Minnis [2010] is a reasonably large sample of private firms. An
advantage of the Sageworks data, in comparison to the majority of researcher available US private
firm datasets, is its longitudinal financial statement data, which enables investigation of the timeseries properties of private firm earnings and cash-flows and changes in financial performance and
position. However, it is important to note that given the sampling and selection by both the data
vendor and author, it is not a representative sample of US private firms. First, all sample firms must
prepare financial statements. In general, private firms are not required to prepare non-tax related
financial statements (Cassar 2009). Second, all sample firms are required to employ the services of an
external accountant to prepare or verify their financial statements to some degree. Private firms may
choose four levels of auditor association, namely an audit, a review, a compilation, or no association.
This exclusion of no association firms is not trivial, as private firms are more likely to prepare their
financial statements without external assistance or verification, than have them compiled, reviewed,
or audited by accountants. Third, all the sample firms must use accrual accounting. Evidence suggests
that most private firms employ a cash basis rather than accrual basis of accounting (Allee and Yohn
2009). Further, lenders frequently allow private firm applicants to submit financial information that
deviates from GAAP, particularly in bases other than accrual accounting (AICPA, 2004; FERF,
2006). Fourth, there is truncation of sample firms for the empirical tests due to the observed extreme
financial ratios, such as sales growth, which will eliminate smaller and riskier firms from the
sample. 1 All these criteria reduce sample heterogeneity which may better isolate the impact of
1

Given Minnis [2010] uses a different sample and different selection criteria than Allee and Yohn [2009], it is
unclear if having a reasonably similar average interest rate supports or rebuts the validity of the inferred cost of debt
variable (see footnote 17 of Minnis [2010]).
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auditing. Moreover, given that the retention of external accountants and the voluntary preparation of
financial statements that are in accordance with GAAP is strongly positively correlated with firm size
(Allee and Yohn 2009; Cassar 2009; Cassar and Ittner 2009), all these criteria will skew the sample
toward larger private firms. 2 The focus on larger private firms, with less uncertainty and riskiness,
reduces the importance of auditing in this sample relative to the broader population of private firms,
suggesting the observed mean effects may actually understate the importance of auditing for private
firms.
2.2 ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION VERIFICATION CHANNELS
Minnis [2010] asserts that the private firm setting overcomes an important complication when
examining financial statement verification in a public firm setting, namely the avoidance of
alternative information verification channels other than an audit. Unfortunately, this assertion is false.
A more correct statement is that private firms have different sources of firm information and financial
statement verification than public firms. While private firms do not have a market where potential
investors value the firm and are not followed by sell-side analysts or the press, these firms have other
hard and soft information sources not controlled for in this study that may substitute for auditor
verification and audited financial statements.
There is a voluminous literature in finance on banking relationships and information
asymmetries between firms and lenders, primarily focused on private firms (see e.g. Berger and Udell
1995; Berger and Udell 2002; Petersen and Rajan 2002; Bharath et al. in press). This evidence
suggests that the “soft” information obtained through a lender’s ongoing relationship with a borrower
may be a better source of information about the borrower’s credit worthiness than hard, quantitative
information, such as financial statements (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cowen and Cowen, 2006). This
2

Given the size of the sample firms it is likely the sample includes private firms with public debt who are subject
to stronger reporting requirements. The presence of these firms, which are also larger and more likely to be audited, will
induce a relation between auditing and lower cost of debt.
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information, such as a loan officer’s knowledge of the potential borrower’s ability, character, and
trustworthiness, is “soft” in the sense that it is difficult to quantify and communicate to others, and
may not be verifiable by outsiders (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen, 2004). Consequently, past and
existing financing relationships, particularly those of longer duration, offer an important source of
information that can reduce information asymmetries and the cost of debt for private firms (Diamond,
1991).
Financial statements are not the only source of “hard” information that lenders can use to
evaluate the financial condition and performance of borrowers. All US private firms are required to
submit tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service that are subject to compliance rules and penalties
for misstatement. Given the compliance requirements, the conservative nature of tax-based
accounting rules, and the incentives of firms to report tax income conservatively to minimize the
present value of tax obligations many financiers request firms’ previously lodged tax returns. Credit
scores also offer another method for obtaining hard, quantified information on private firms to assess
the probability that borrowers will meet their loan obligations (Petersen, 2004). Credit scoring
agencies, such as Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac, calculate these scores using a broad set of
information on financial performance and condition, as well as credit history, business demographics,
and other public information such as court judgments or liens (e.g., Frame et al., 2001; Akhavein et
al., 2005; Berger et al., 2005). Broader availability of third-party credit scores and reduced cost of
information transfer have led an increasing number of banks to utilize these scores in loan approval
and pricing (Cowan and Cowan, 2006; Petersen, 2004). Consequently, the economics literature on
small business lending suggests that third-party credit scores provide an alternative means for
reducing information asymmetries by giving lenders a cost-effective and timely method of
monitoring borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger and Frame, 2007). Therefore, financial
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information in tax returns and credit scores provide alternative “hard” information that may substitute
for furnished financial statements under GAAP.
The extent to which financial accounting verification and quality is a substitute or
complement to these hard and soft alternative information sources is unclear, as the quality of these
other sources varies across firms. While not observed by Minnis [2010] his findings do suggest that
on average audited financial statements provide benefits beyond these other information sources.
Exploiting the private firm setting to investigate the role of financial accounting quality and
alternative information sources as a means for reducing information asymmetries is a fruitful area of
research.
2.3 OMITTED CORRELATED VARIABLES
The private firm setting has several unique features that both exacerbate the importance of
some influences and encourage the use of other mechanisms to reduce the impact of information
asymmetries between the firm and lenders. Research on private firm financing, particularly using the
SSBF, has documented many factors that substantially affect private firm loan pricing decisions, such
as the loan characteristics, contractual terms, and the characteristics of the entrepreneur. As Minnis’s
set of independent variables is confined to the firm’s financial characteristics, it is likely that any of
his findings derived from econometric methods that are susceptible to omitted correlated variable bias
will be affected.
First, there is no information on the type of loans these firms have obtained. The extent that
firm debt is comprised of line of credit versus various asset backed loans, such as mortgage,
equipment, or motor vehicle loans is unclear. Other unobserved basic loan specific characteristics
include the size of a given loan, loan maturity, and whether the loan has fixed or floating interest rate.
All these loan characteristics have been shown to significantly affect the interest rates of private firm
loans (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002). Also, there is no information about the
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contracting terms of the loans, such as the use of collateral, guarantees, contingent provisions,
covenants, or performance pricing. Financers can reduce the role or need for firm information and
verification by including contracting provisions in the financing agreement, such as requiring
collateral or personal guarantees. Research on debt financing shows the importance of these
contractual features on loan terms for larger firms (Asquith Beatty and Weber 2005; Roberts and Sufi
2009), yet contracting term importance is heightened for smaller private firms (Berger and Udell
1998; Scholtens 1999). Further, empirical evidence shows that many of the contractual features in
private firm loans, such as collateral use, are a function of firm characteristics, such as information
opacity and riskiness (Berger and Udell 1990; Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina 2006). The unobserved
loan type and contract features matter substantially for small firm lending, which by itself could
explain the variations in firms’ cost of debt.
Second, the nexus between the owner manager’s ability and firm performance is substantially
stronger in private firms. In many cases it is difficult to disentangle the human capital or financial
capital of the owner-manager or entrepreneur from the firm (Wiklund and Shepherd 2003;
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). Consequently, the characteristics of the owners and
managers of private firms play a substantially more prominent role in the performance and loan
pricing decisions than in public firms. Lenders can infer information about the owner’s ability, which
is associated with firm performance and likelihood of repayment of debt obligations, by the observed
success of his current and previous businesses, the owner’s formal education or industry-specific
experience. Information about the owner’s trustworthiness can be obtained from the personal credit
history of the entrepreneur, such as whether he has previously defaulted, had judgments against him,
or been in bankruptcy. All these dimensions have been shown to increase the cost of debt provided to
owner–managed firms (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002). Further, the substantial literature
that has investigated discrimination in small firm financing suggests that in some market settings US
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entrepreneurs do obtain different denial and interest rate terms on the basis of the gender and race of
the entrepreneur (Bates 1991; Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman 2003; Cavalluzzo, and
Cavalluzzo 1998; Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002). Therefore, not identifying and
controlling for entrepreneur heterogeneity ignores significant variation that has been documented to
affect private firm’s cost of debt.
I use the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) administrated by the Federal
Reverse Board to demonstrate the potential unexplained variation in interest rates by comparing the
explanatory power of excluded versus included variables. I discuss how interest rates are measured
later, but even if interest rates were measured correctly, many important control variables are
missing. The 2003 SSBF is a nationally representative sample of 4,240 for-profit, nonfinancial,
nonfarm, nonsubsidiary business enterprises of fewer than 500 employees, constructed from a
stratified random sample based on employment size, urban/rural status, and census divisions. The
objective of my analysis is not to provide a complete model of independent variables to predict firm
interest rates, as there are hundreds of candidate variables available in the SSBF, but to demonstrate
that the inclusion of just a few omitted variables can explain a substantial amount of the variation
observed in private firm loan pricing decisions. I focus my analysis on the 767 privately-held firms
that used their firm’s financial statements for the SSBF interview. 3 These respondents were asked
whether the financial statements were: 1) audited (n = 226); 2) reviewed (n = 168); 3) compiled (n =
111), by a professional accountant or accounting firm; or 4) none of the above (n = 262). The
dependent variable (Audit) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm is audited, and zero

3

Given the wording of the question, the remaining 2,960 private firms with non-missing assets, sales, and
shareholders may have prepared and furnished financial statements to debt financiers, but not used them specifically in
the SSBF interview. These remaining respondents were not asked about auditor association. I also remove 52 firms that
used their firm’s financial statements for the SSBF interview but did not provide the firm’s auditor association. Firms
with imputed data are also excluded from the analysis.
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otherwise. Four hundred and thirty six of these firms applied for debt financing within the last three
years, with 411 having some debt financing approved.
The variables I use to model firm interest rates are: the natural logarithm of the loan amount
(Loan Amount), an indicator if the loan has a fixed (versus floating) interest rate (Fixed), an indicator
if the loan is a line-of-credit loan (Line of Credit), an indicator if collateral is provided for the loan
(Collateral), an indicator if an owner has declared bankruptcy or had a judgment rendered against
them (Default), and an indicator if the race of the majority owner is non-white (Non-White). As
observed from Table 1, these six variables with Audit explain 21.1 percent of the total variance in
firm interest rates. Consequently, if these omitted variables are associated with audit choice, this will
likely result in omitted correlated variable bias.
In the remaining models I include most of the variables from Minnis’s analysis, namely: the
natural log of total firm assets (Firm Size), firm debt to assets (Leverage), an indicator if the firm has
negative book equity (Negative Equity), an indicator if the firm had greater sales than three years
earlier (Sales Growth), and an indicator if the firm was a C-Corporation (C-Corp). I also include
return-on-assets (ROA) to capture the effect of profitability on loan pricing, as interest coverage, in
addition to current ratio and PPE, is not available in the SSBF. The explanatory power of these
variables is 16.3 percent of the total variance in interest rates. However, as shown by the inclusion
and exclusion of firm total assets, the majority of the explanatory power is driven by firm assets, with
the explained variance decreasing to 5.6 percent when firm assets is removed from the model.
Additionally, with the inclusion of firm total assets, none of the remaining variables in the model are
significantly associated with interest rates, including Audit, which decreases substantially in
economic magnitude with the inclusion of firm size. This highlights the strong association between
firm size and audit that I will develop later.
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The right-most column of Table 1 provides the results of the interest rate model with all the
independent variables listed above. If the omitted variables do not explain the variance in interest
rates after the inclusion of Minnis’s variables then it is less likely these omitted variables will affect
his study’s results. However, these additional variables do continue to explain a substantial
proportion of the variation in interest rates, with the model R-squared by including the six additional
variables increasing from 16.3 to 24.9 percent. I find loans contracted with a fixed interest rate have
an interest rate 145 basis points higher than loans with floating interest rates. Further, private firms
that are majority owned by non-white owners have interest rates that are 130 basis points greater than
firms that are majority owned by white entrepreneurs. The inclusion of additional control variables
may mitigate the economic importance of these two variables; however, the fact that these variables
have a substantial influence on interest rates after controlling for the majority of variables in Minnis’s
model suggests that variables omitted from his study have an influential role in private firm interest
rates. Given the economic magnitude of the omitted variable effects, even a weak association
between these variables and firms’ audit choice will induce a noticeable omitted correlated variable
bias. While an omitted correlated variable bias cannot be ruled out or confirmed, the scope and
explanatory power of variables not controlled for increases the likelihood that an omitted variable is
spuriously affecting the results.
2.4 APPROPRIATENESS OF INFERRED COST OF DEBT
Minnis [2010] estimates firms’ cost of debt as the ratio of reported interest expense on the
average of the beginning and ending total liabilities. This approach is used, rather than the ideal
approach of identifying specific loans and their characteristics, as there is no loan specific
information in his database. As acknowledged by the author, an estimated average cost of debt
measure inferred from the income statement and balance sheet results in substantial noise in the
dependent variable. However, these cost of debt measurement concerns are exacerbated when
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examining smaller private firms raising doubts as to the applicability of this measurement approach
for the research setting.
First, the identification and measurement of liabilities, particularly debt that is contracted at
arm’s length, is less clear in smaller firms. Many private firms’ balance sheets include liabilities
representing loans from the owner-manager. The determination of an interest rate for a loan from the
owner to his firm is to some degree arbitrary and often driven by tax considerations. Research also
shows that a proportion of private firm financing is from insiders, such as friends and family, who
have substantial knowledge of the firm or have strong ties to the entrepreneur, making them less
likely to be subject to the entrepreneur’s opportunistic behavior (Bates 1997; Cassar and Holmes
2003). Consequently, it is not clear that the interest rate of an insider-originated loan should be
affected by whether the firm’s financial statements are audited. More concerning is the extent to
which insider-based private firm debt is not issued at arm’s length, offered for altruistic reasons, or
even issued without the intention of being repaid (Ang, 1992; Bygrave et al. 2003). It is debatable to
what extent we can make economically reasoned inferences from interest expenses and debt that is
not contracted on at arm’s length. Further, there are problems with the identification of debt and
equity or the use of quasi-equity by smaller firms, resulting in the arbitrary classification of some
balance sheet financing (Ang, 1992; Cassar and Holmes 2003). Therefore, differences between
private and public firms, such as the ability to accurately identify arm’s length liabilities of firm
outsiders, likely results in greater estimation noise when inferring cost of debt from private firms’
financial statements.
Second, the inferred cost of debt measure suffers from staleness, in that a portion of the
observed interest rate has been contracted on many years earlier. To demonstrate this point using
other private firm data, the average (median) maturity for the 1,620 loans in the SSBF is 45 (16.5)
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months, with 30 percent of loans having a maturity 60 months or greater. 4 Moreover, only 44.7
percent of the private firms in the SSBF applied for new loans or renewed existing loans in the
previous three years, with 41.4 percent obtaining loans during this period. 5 Further, even if the firm
does take out a new loan, this loan amount is not the total amount of firm debt outstanding. Of the
SSBF firms that obtained new loans, these loans represented approximately 36 percent of their total
liabilities outstanding. This evidence demonstrates a substantial portion of the inferred
contemporaneous interest rate of private firms relates to contracting that was undertaken many years
earlier. These identification issues affect both the denominator (total liabilities) and numerator
(interest expense), imparting considerable noise in the study’s cost of debt dependent variable. Cost
of debt staleness also reduces the effectiveness of the control variables given their potential variation
over a several year period. Empirical approaches to address the reduced effectiveness of controls
driven by the staleness in the inferred cost of debt measure include examining interest rate variation
of firms that change auditor association status, as undertaken by Minnis (2010) on 31 firms and Kim,
Simunic, Stein and Yi (2007) on 840 firms.
Third, all else equal, the audit process affects the values reported for interest expense and total
liabilities. These measurement deviations will lead to differences in Minnis’s firms’ inferred interest
rates even when firms have identical interest rates on their debt. Indeed, Minnis’s thesis is that the
audit process will change the accounting values reported in the financial statements, which may alter
the financial ratios, such as cost of debt, in a systematic manner (Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter,
1997). For example, given the reporting incentives of firms and the role of the audit function, audited

4

Using sample weights based on the population of US private firms the average (median) loan maturity is 53
(36) months.
5
Fifty three point six percent of firms that provided auditor association in the SSBF obtained loans in the
previous three years. This percentage is larger as this subsample includes larger private firms, which are more likely to
obtain recent loans. Further, as Minnis’s sample includes a greater proportion of larger private firms relative to the SSBF
sample it is likely that a greater proportion of Minnis’s sample have obtained recent loan financing compared to the SSBF
sample.
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financial statements may be less likely to have omitted liabilities on the balance sheet. If so, firms
with audited financial statements will have higher reported debt and leverage ratios, consistent with
Minnis’s univariate findings, and by construction a lower inferred cost of debt. Conversely, the audit
function may ensure audited financial statements are less likely to have omitted or understated
interest expenses on the income statement. Under these conjectures, the difference in cost of debt is
not caused by a change in the firm’s explicit debt cost but by how auditing mechanically affects the
measurement of the dependent variable in this study. How much of the variation in the cost of debt is
driven by an actual lowering of interest rates on loans, as opposed to being driven by the
measurement and reporting of the numerator and denominator is unclear.
Therefore, accurate identification of arm’s length liabilities of firm outsiders, loan maturities
beyond one year, and the effect of auditing on accounting values lead to significant noise and even
systematic bias in the study’s cost of debt dependent variable, especially when studying smaller
firms.
3. Endogenous Audit Choice
3.1. Is Auditing Always Voluntary?
Generally, there is no mandated requirement for US private firms to have their financial
statements audited. However, conference participants provided several examples where private firms
are required to be audited. For example, a lender can require an audit for the firm to obtain a large
working capital or asset based financing loan, which uses collateral from receivables. Having an audit
is also a necessary requirement for firms to obtain some types of insurance. As noted by the author,
an audit is often a condition to obtain a surety bond. If specific types of loans and outcomes are
related to auditor association and also affect firm interest rates beyond auditing choice, this will
induce a spurious correlation between audit use and firm interest rate. Both the type of financing and
insurance used by the sample firms is unobservable from the data, and therefore, the extent to which
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this affects the findings is undetermined. However, it is important to note that the use of a valid
instrument for audit use empirically overcomes a potential spurious association between auditing
demand due to financing loan type or insurance on firm cost of debt.
3.2 Validity of Instrument
A concern with simply regressing firms’ interest rates on firms’ audit use to determine the
effect of auditing on cost of debt is that the choice to be audited may be endogenously determined. If
firms’ audit choices are correlated with unobserved factors that also affect firms’ interest rates this
will bias the coefficients from a simple regression model. Consequently, Minnis employs an
endogenous switching model to account for potential selection bias and instruments the endogenous
audit choice. To instrument for firms’ audit choice Minnis uses the percentage of firm-years that are
audited in the vendor’s database for each state. He argues that this instrument proxies for differences
in states’ attestation regulatory environments, which influence the supply and demand for auditing
services. The identification of an appropriate instrument in empirical research is a very difficult
endeavor. A valid instrument for this study must be correlated with the independent variable of
interest, firm audit choice, and unrelated to the dependent variable, firm cost of debt. Conference
participants questioned the validity of Minnis’s instrument on several grounds.
First, it is unclear what the differences in state percentages of auditing use are capturing and
whether they may have anything to do with the state’s attestation regulatory environment. Beyond the
licensure of Certified Public Accountants, this percentage may capture variations in taxation of
business, corporate governance, wealth, education, and industry effects. Some of these factors are
likely associated with firm interest rates. Even given all these potential differences it appears unlikely
that the state’s attestation regulatory environment can explain the observed variation in audit use
across states. Conference participants questioned whether it is plausible that variations in state
attestation regulation could explain differences in the likelihood of a private firm being audited across
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states from 8.1 percent to 38.5 percent. If the percentage of firms’ auditor use is simply capturing the
state’s banking or economic environment, is it likely that this instrument is not exogenous to firms’
interest rates. Minnis attempts to address this concern by orthogonalizing the state audit instrument to
variables that proxy for the state’s litigation and banking environment. However, the raw state audit
instrument and the orthogonalized instrument have practically identical univariate correlations with
the remaining study variables, so it is unclear how effective this treatment is. 6 Given these
plausibility concerns, conference participants suggested that a direct measure, based on state specific
legislation and professional requirements, would be a more convincing choice of instrument.
Second, a likely explanation for the strong correlation (ρ = 0.22) between the likelihood that
another private firm in the same state is audited and the firm’s own audit choice is sample selection.
As the instrument is not based on a population percentage of audit use but a vendor’s database with
non-random selection, this instrument is likely correlated with firm characteristics. Specifically, the
data are primarily obtained from CPAs and banks who input their clients’ financial data. As these
service firms’ client data are geographically clustered, any variation in the selection of firms by those
inputting the data, or types of customers they serve, will induce correlation between the state audit
and firm audit variables. For example, if a particular CPA only services large audit clients, this will
artificially increase both the mean percentage of firms who are audited and mean firm size in a given
state. As the variables state audit and size are highly correlated with audit choice, and explain
essentially all the variation in the audit instrument, it is likely that the audit instrument is noisy proxy
of omitted firm characteristics. Given these empirical concerns, particularly the mechanical
endogeneity of audit choice in the instrument, it is unclear if the benefits of adopting an instrumented
variable approach outweigh other econometric methods that do not rely on the identification of an
exogenous instrument.

6

Alternatively, the very similar correlations for the raw and orthogonalized versions of state audit proportion the

16

3.3 Propensity Score Matching
Given the concerns of the instrument employed, Minnis [2010] performs additional analysis
using propensity score matching. While a critique of propensity score matching is it cannot match on
unobserved correlated variables, potentially resulting in an increase rather than a decrease in hidden
bias, an advantage of propensity score matching is it does not require an assumption of linearity of
the control variables on the treatment variable. 7 Econometric methods that relax the linearity
assumption may be particularly useful when research suggests a strong association between the
control and treatment variable, such as firm size and firm audit use (Allee and Yohn 2009). The
importance of not adequately controlling for firm size in this context should not be underestimated.
As Minnis reports, simple matching by industry and firm size alone reduces the observed audit effect
on firm cost of debt by one-third relative to the findings using an instrumental approach designed to
control for firms’ endogenous audit choice.
Consistent with previous research, Minnis [2010] observes a univariate correlation between
audit use and firm total assets of ρ = 0.30. Further, he finds firm size is the primary explanatory
variable in the model to explain firm audit choice (t-stat = 25.97). Beyond the instrument the
remaining independent variables provide limited additional explanatory power on firms’ audit choice.
To demonstrate the role of firm size on SSBF firms, I model auditor use by the firm as a function of
firm characteristics. I exclude variables related to loan characteristics, as these are very likely to be
exogenous to the firm’s auditor association choice. Table 2 provides the probit estimation for the
model predicting auditor use. Similar to Minnis’s sample, there is a strong positive association
between auditor use and firm size for the SSBF sample (z = 4.75, p < 0.001). Further, removing firm
size from the probit model lowers the pseudo R-squared from 4.7 percent to 2.1 percent. This strong
could be seen as supporting the premise that state audit proportion is reasonably orthogonal to the interest rate variable.
7

For a general discussion of alternative econometric approaches to address endogeneity, including instrumental
variables and propensity matching, see Core [2010].
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association, which has been observed in all previous auditing use research, highlights the importance
of adequately controlling for firm size when estimating the effect of auditing on firm interest rates.
Given these concerns Minnis employs propensity score matching incorporating firm size controls and
in robustness tests truncates the sample to reduce size-related heterogeneity. Importantly, Minnis
reports that his inferences are unchanged when using a propensity score matching approach.
However, Minnis finds the average treatment effect of auditing on firm interest rates is highly
sensitive to small changes in the potential impact of unobservable variables. As discussed earlier,
there are many potential omitted variables that are strongly associated with firm interest rates, which
may result in spurious observed effects between auditing and firm interest rates. Therefore, I agree
with the author’s assessment that the inferences from these propensity score tests should be viewed
with some skepticism.
To investigate the potential the non-effect of audit use on interest rates in the SSBF sample is
driven by inadequate control for firm size and other firm characteristics, I perform a propensity
matching estimation described by Minnis [2010] using the SSBF variables provided in the probit
model above. I observe an average treatment effect of -0.299 for audited firms, which is larger than
the estimate obtained using OLS that does not control for audit choice endogeneity. However, this
treatment effect is not statistically significant (se = 0.343, t = -0.871, iterations = 1,000) and highly
sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables. For example, inclusion of the variables
related to loan characteristics with the determinant variables of auditor use in Table 2 results in an
average treatment effect of -0.060 for audited firms (se = 0.373, t = -0.162, iterations = 1,000).
Therefore, like Minnis’s propensity score findings, the propensity score estimates from the SSBF
sample should be viewed with caution.
Finally, one important feature between the various econometric methods that is ignored is the
extent that the determinant variables of auditor use are stable. This is important as the audit
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verification choice of a firm is very sticky. An explanation for the stickiness is the strong negative
signal of firm position and performance and subsequent reputation costs borne by the firm if it
removes audit verification. In fact, of the 26,005 firm-years with consecutive years of firm data, the
author mentioned there were only 31 occasions where audit association changed. 8 Therefore, the
choice to use an auditor for the majority of sample firms was made many years before observing the
firm. Consequently, many of the financial characteristics of the firm, such as interest coverage and
current ratio, may be very different than those modeled in the year investigated. Given that firm size
and state affiliation are the two most important determinants of the endogenous audit choice and that
these variables are relatively stable over time compared to accounting variables, simple matching or
propensity matching across these two dimensions to control for the sticky auditing choice intuitively
seems more convincing than the instrumented variable approach in the paper.
4. Hypotheses
4.1

DOES

AUDITING

RESULT

IN

GREATER

SENSITIVITY

TO

FINANCIAL

INFORMATION? (HYPOTHESIS TWO)
The paper’s second hypothesis is that the cost of debt is more sensitive to the financial
information of audited firms. Specifically, the audit verification of the firm’s accounting process and
reporting gives the firm’s financial statements greater credibility, resulting in lenders’ pricing
decisions being more sensitive to variations in accounting ratios of audited firms. To empirically test
variations in loan pricing sensitivity Minnis compares the coefficients of accounting ratios from an
endogenous switching model predicting cost of debt for audited and non-audited firms. He finds three
of the seven accounting ratios, interest coverage, current ratio, and PPE, have significantly larger

8

Note the changes in firm audit association are substantially understated due to the requirement that firms be in
the dataset for consecutive years. As CPAs are the most prominent inputters of data, firms that hire accountants for the
first time will generally not be included in this sample.
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negative coefficients for audited firms and concludes from this evidence that cost of debt is more
sensitive to audited financial information. However, there are several concerns with this inference.
First, it is unclear why these three particular ratios of the seven accounting variables
investigated are of most importance to loan pricing decisions, aside from these three having
statistically significant differences in the direction hypothesized. For example, it is uncertain why
lenders loan pricing decisions should be more sensitive to variations in a firm’s current ratio due to
auditing but not be more sensitive to variations in a firm’s leverage and negative equity. Further, two
of the remaining four changes in accounting variable coefficients are in the opposite direction one
would predict if firm auditing resulted in greater sensitivity to accounting variables. 9 Taken as a
whole and without further elaboration from the author, the change in coefficients between audited
and non-audited firms is not very convincing evidence to support the second hypothesis.
Second, there are concerns with the validity of the estimated coefficients. For example, the
coefficient on negative equity for audited firms is significantly different in the opposite direction
hypothesized, with audited (non-audited) firms with negative equity having a reduction in their cost
of debt of 85 (1) basis points. A theoretical explanation as to why only audited firms with negative
equity would be rewarded with significantly lower interest rates is not obvious. As another example,
it is unclear why non-audited firms have a lower cost of debt as their leverage, and therefore
riskiness, increases. The endogenous switching model allows the effect of firm characteristics on
interest rates to vary between audited and non-audited firms to maximize the model’s overall
explanatory power. 10 However, interpretation of an average treatment effect becomes more tenuous

9

Another variable, while statistically different, is ambiguous as to whether the change in coefficients supports or
contradicts the notion that auditing will result in loan pricing exhibiting greater sensitivity to accounting information.
10

A few prior studies have found a similar relation between leverage and cost of debt, but none of these studies
use econometric techniques that allow the effect of leverage on cost of debt to vary within sample.
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when the estimated effect of the remaining variables on the dependent variable differs substantially
across treatment groups for non-obvious or counter-intuitive reasons.
Third, and more generally, it is not clear if auditing should result in significantly more
negative coefficients on financial statement variables. Consider PPE, which had the strongest
observed difference between audited and non-audited firms. If a lender has higher quality or complete
information about the firm’s financial performance the verification of the firm’s tangible assets
becomes less important, which is the opposite direction predicted by Minnis. In general, the
importance of tangible assets on loan pricing and the interest rate benefit from providing collateral
will be greater for more risky or informationally opaque firms (Ortiz-Molina and Penas 2008).
Therefore, it is unclear if the weight on financial statement information, particularly balance sheet
information, should increase uniformly as higher quality firm information is obtained by lenders.
Both the estimation results and the ex ante ambiguity about why all financial statement information
would be more important for audited firms raises doubt that the evidence is generally consistent with
cost of debt being more sensitive to financial statement information of audited firms.
4.2 DO AUDITORS INCREASE THE PERSISTENCE OF NET INCOME? (HYPOTHESIS
THREE)
The paper’s third hypothesis is that audit verification improves the predictive ability of
reported net income on future cash flows. Minnis [2010] uses the empirical approach of Barth, Cram
and Nelson [2001] to estimate the predictive ability (persistence) of current cash flows and accruals
on future cash flows. Consistent with his arguments he finds (in Table 8) greater persistence in net
income for audited firms than non-audited firms, both in the cash flow and accrual component of net
income. Specifically, the cash flow coefficient for audited (non-audited) firms on one-year ahead
cash flow is 0.625 (0.560) and the coefficient on net income for audited (non-audited) firms is 0.638
(0.503). Comparing these coefficients to Barth, Cram and Nelson’s [2001] findings suggests that the
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ability of accruals to predict future cash flows in audited private firms is approximately three times
greater for than for publicly listed firms (ACCRUALS = 0.22; BCN 2001 Table 4, column 1).
Obviously, readers should not conclude from this joint comparison that smaller private firms have
greater persistence of accruals than larger public firms as it contradicts previous empirical evidence
and Minnis’s size-related hypothesis.
An alternative explanation for these unusual findings is the different estimation process used
by Minnis, compared to Barth, Cram and Nelson [2001], to determine cash flows and accruals which
induces significant noise in the accrual and cash flow variables. Specifically, Minnis [2010] obtains
earnings from the income statement and estimates accruals using Sloan’s [1996] balance sheet
approach, summing the changes in end-of-year balances of various assets and liabilities. He then
estimates net cash flow from operations as earnings minus accruals. The estimation of accruals and
cash flows using the balance sheet approach is heavily dependent on the measurement accuracy of the
balance sheet components, which is lower in private firms. The balance sheet method is also sensitive
to the many influences, such as articulation between years, and extraordinary items, which are
identified in public firm databases but usually not in private firm databases (Hribar and Collins
2002). Outside of this explanation or sample truncation, the magnitude of difference observed in the
accrual coefficients across these two studies (in the opposite direction to that suggested by prior
research) raises doubt as to the validity of the paper’s persistence findings.
Moreover, conference participants suggested splitting total accruals into its various
components to isolate which specific accruals improve their informativeness from being audited. For
example, should it be that accruals related to revenue recognition will have the same auditor benefit
and those related to inventory? Some accrual measurement may benefit more from auditing due to
extent of managerial discretion, ease of manipulation, expertise to measure, or greater uncertainty
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(Richardson et al. 2005). Examination of potential heterogeneity in persistence across accrual
components could result in better identification of the benefits from auditor use.
The broader question is whether the improved predictive ability of net income on one-yearahead cash flow is a primary mechanism for why audited firms have a lower cost of debt. There are
several other potential reasons why auditing affects firms’ cost of debt. For example, an audit reduces
the need for a financier to expend resources in verifying the faithfulness of the firm’s financial
position and performance in the financial statements. Given competition in firms’ debt financing, this
reduction in monitoring costs should be reflected in a lower cost of debt offered to the firm. Further,
as audits provide assurance through comprehensively evaluating the firm’s accounting operations and
controls, auditors can provide benefits to lenders beyond financial reporting. For example, validating
the effectiveness of how cash is transferred and monitored throughout the firm reduces the likelihood
of fraud by management.
Even within the sphere of financial reporting are debt financiers more interested in the
persistence of earnings components and the mapping of future events in current financial statements
or specifically the timely revelation of bad outcomes? (Guay and Verrecchia 2006). As mentioned in
a footnote, Minnis [2010] also finds that audited firms do report more conservatively. However,
persistence and conservatism are not analogous and capture very different constructs. For example,
the empirical correlation between timely loss recognition and persistence is lower than two percent
(Dechow Ge Schrand, 2010). Further, if auditor use increases the likelihood that a firm writes down
their book asset values this will increase the firm’s timely loss recognition; however, it may decrease
earnings persistence. Understanding the mechanisms by which firms benefit from auditing is an
ongoing and interesting area of research.
4.3 WHAT DOES FIRM SIZE CAPTURE?
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Minnis [2010] argues that both the interest rate reductions and the improvement in predictive
ability of accruals from auditing are stronger in smaller firms because smaller firms have weaker
accounting systems. The assertion that internal accounting capabilities and accounting system quality
is increasing in firm size is entirely consistent with empirical evidence (Allee and Yohn 2009; Cassar
2009). However, firm size is also correlated with many other firm attributes, including uncertainty,
complexity, available resources, riskiness, and information asymmetry (Berger and Udell 1998;
Bharath et al. in press). Therefore, without better identification it is uncertain what the size-related
partitions capture.
Consider an alternative argument for the size-related findings that auditors provide greater
assistance to firms where there is greater uncertainty. Many studies have documented that smaller
firms have greater variability in performance and greater uncertainty (Cassar and Gibson 2008). In
regard to persistence, researchers argue that larger firms have more stable and predictable operations
which results in more accurate accrual estimation (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Indeed, the results
from Minnis [2010] (Table 10) show that larger firms have greater persistence in both accruals and
cash flows. Unfortunately, there is little attempt to disentangle alternative explanations for why
auditors matter more. Therefore, whether the size results are driven by firm internal capabilities
versus other size correlated constructs is unclear.
Further, for the sized-based auditing results to be driven by smaller firms having weaker
accounting systems requires an assumption that firms with different accounting internal capabilities
will not systematically differ in their demand for non-audit external accounting assistance. Firms that
do not undertake audits for their financial statements can still employ professional accountants for
review, compilation, tax return preparation, management advisory and other services. The provision
of non-audit services by external accountants may increase the sophistication of firm’s internal
accounting systems or create economic bonds that weaken auditor independence and diminish audit
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quality, reducing the benefit of formal auditing services (Lim and Tan 2008). Alternatively, non-audit
services may allow auditors to use their firm specific knowledge to further improve the firm’s
accounting systems and audit quality. Interestingly, research suggests that accounting expertise in
private firms, as represented by owner-managers’ occupational accounting experience, actually
increases the likelihood that the firm retains an external accountant (Cassar and Ittner 2009). The role
of non-audit accountant association is not considered and assumed constant across firms in Minnis’s
study. Therefore, the extent that non-audit services effect firm internal accounting sophistication and
influence the benefit of auditing services on firms’ cost of debt is uncertain.
5. Conclusion
In this discussion I review Minnis [2010] in the context of the broader literature on private
firm financing. I describe the unique features private firm setting and how it affects research design
and inference. I detail the alternative information sources available to debt financiers of private firms
that may limit the role of auditors and firm financial statements. Further, I review the broad literature
in the private firm setting that documents the many omitted correlated variables that affect cost of
debt. Differences between private and public firms, such as the ability to accurately identify arm’s
length liabilities of firm outsiders, likely results in greater estimation noise when inferring cost of
debt from firms’ financial statements.
There are several concerns regarding the validity of the econometric methods used and the
specific hypotheses raised by Minnis [2010]. Given the empirical concerns about the instrument used,
particularly its potential mechanical endogeneity, matching-based approaches that do not rely on the
identification of an exogenous variable arguably provide more convincing evidence. There was
further potential to explore the specific mechanisms by which auditors affect cost of debt and
disentangle why the auditors appear to assist small firms more than large firms. But these debates
aside, Minnis [2010] investigates an important and timely topic. The private firm setting offers many
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opportunities to understand fundamental accounting issues. Researchers that exploit the varied
environmental, regulatory and other forces that affect private firms and the empirical variation in this
setting can provide many important insights.
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TABLE 1
Interest Rate Analysis

Independent variables
Audit
Loan Amount
Fixed
Line of Credit
Collateral
Default
Non-White
Firm Size
ROA
Leverage
Negative Equity
Sales Growth
C-Corp
Intercept
R2
F-stat
n

(1)
Omitted Variables
Coefficient Std. error
-0.170
-0.889***
1.372***
0.225
0.049
-0.253
1.446***

0.291
0.196
0.341
0.334
0.309
0.824
0.446

(2)
Without Firm Size
Coefficient
Std. error

(3)
With Firm Size
Coefficient
Std. error

(4)
All Variables
Coefficient Std. error

-0.479

0.310

-0.023

0.300

0.148
0.340
0.578
0.297
0.303
0.349

-1.267***
0.053
-0.565
0.422
-0.425
-0.112
13.941***

0.186
0.147
0.322
0.548
0.284
0.289
1.179

-0.107
-0.278
1.454***
0.113
0.076
-0.266
1.303***
-0.716***
0.139
-0.358
0.269
-0.417
-0.269
11.162***

0.368**
-0.398
0.779
-0.721**
-0.395
6.226***
0.211
14.000***
374

0.056
3.652***
374

a

0.163
10.158***
374

0.291
0.271
0.339
0.332
0.306
0.822
0.443
0.269
0.144
0.315
0.526
0.271
0.279
1.316

0.249
9.174***
374

Table reports ordinary least squares estimation. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. Independent variables
are: an indicator variable if the firm is audited (Audit), the log 10 of the loan amount (Loan Amount), an indicator if the loan has a fixed interest
rate (Fixed), an indicator if the loan is a line-of-credit loan (Line of Credit), an indicator if collateral is provided for the loan (Collateral), an
indicator if an owner has declared bankruptcy or had a judgment rendered against them (Default), an indicator if the race of the majority owner
is non-white (Non-White), the log 10 of total firm assets (Firm Size), firm return-on-assets (ROA), firm debt to assets (Leverage), an indicator if
the firm has negative book equity (Negative Equity), an indicator if the firm had greater sales than three years earlier (Sales Growth), and an
indicator if the firm was a C-Corporation (C-Corp). All indicator variables are coded one if true, and zero otherwise. Financial ratios
(Leverage, ROA) are Winzorized at 5 percent based on the 767 firms that provided auditor association in the SSBF. ***, **, * denotes
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively.
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TABLE 2
Prediction Model for Use of Auditor

Independent variables
Firm Size
ROA
Leverage
Negative Equity
Sales Growth
C-Corp
Default
Non-White
Intercept

(1)
With Firm Size
Coefficient Std. error
0.284***
-0.107**
0.179*
-0.271
-0.173*
-0.179
-0.067
0.070
-2.002***

Pseudo R2
χ2
Log likelihood
n

0.060
0.054
0.105
0.213
0.103
0.129
0.355
0.153
0.347

0.047
42.12***
-428.046
744

a

(2)
Without Firm Size
Coefficient
Std. error

-0.174***
0.150
-0.361*
-0.085
0.039
-0.142
0.031
-0.485

0.052
0.104
0.211
0.100
0.119
0.352
0.152
0.130

0.021
18.91***
-439.653
744

Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable (Audit) is coded one if the firm is audited and zero
otherwise. Independent variables are the log 10 of total firm assets (Firm Size), firm return-on-assets
(ROA), firm debt to assets (Leverage), an indicator if the firm has negative book equity (Negative
Equity), an indicator if the firm had greater sales than three years earlier (Sales Growth), an indicator if
the firm was a C-Corporation (C-Corp), an indicator if an owner has declared bankruptcy or had a
judgment rendered against them (Default), and an indicator if the race of the majority owner is nonwhite (Non-White). All indicator variables are coded one if true, and zero otherwise. Financial ratios
(Leverage, ROA) are Winzorized at 5 percent based on the 767 firms that provided auditor association
in the SSBF. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively.
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